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I. INTRODUCTION
Antipsychotic drugs “alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain and can cause
irreversible and fatal side effects.”1 Furthermore, they “act at all levels of the central
nervous system as well as on multiple organ systems. [They] can induce catatoniclike states, alter electroencephalographic tracings, and cause swelling of the brain.
Adverse reactions include drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams,
hypertension, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration,
headache, constipation, blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and
muscle spasms.”2 As well as these symptoms, they can also cause “tardive
dyskinesia, an often irreversible syndrome of uncontrollable movements that can
prevent a person from exercising basic functions such as driving an automobile, and
neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which is 30% fatal for those who suffer from it.
The risk of side effects increases over time.”3 In light of these daunting risks, it is no
1
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2

Id. at 239-40.

3

Id.
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surprise that the person faced with the risk of forced administration of these drugs
stated that he would rather die than take them.4
The Supreme Court of the United States recently decided whether the state act of
forcibly administering these antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants solely for
trial competency purposes is constitutional.5 The Court previously held that the
government could do so under certain circumstances, the most essential of which
being that the person in custody pose a danger to himself or others.6 This present
case, however, marked the first time the Court ruled on whether the government
could administer the drugs solely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.7
In the decision, the Court crafted a 4-prong test which the government would
have to pass in order to forcibly administer the drugs.8 However, practically
speaking, absent a showing of dangerousness, the delineated test will be difficult, if
not impossible, to meet. Unfortunately, since this question of dangerousness is the
dispositive issue and the Court has continually failed to outline a clear standard of
scrutiny to be applied, the individuals fundamental right to be free from unwanted
antipsychotic medication remains in jeopardy, subject to less fundamental and
compelling state interests.
Part II of this note reviews the substance of the Sell decision, including the test it
delineates. It also reviews the paramount cases upon which Sell was decided. Part
III focuses on the different standards of scrutiny applied in each of those cases at the
Supreme Court level, as well as the lower court’s invoked standards of scrutiny. Part
IV analyzes where the Court has left this doctrine in light of the Sell decision and
why its effectiveness as a safeguard for an individual’s significant liberty interest in
remaining free from unwanted antipsychotic medication is in serious jeopardy.
II. HISTORY OF CASES INVOLVING FORCED ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATION ON INDIVIDUALS
A. Sell v. United States
The Sell decision dealt with a former dentist charged with submitting fictitious
insurance claims for payment, which resulted in a grand jury indictment charging
him with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count
of money laundering. A few months later, the grand jury issued another indictment
charging Sell with attempted murder of an FBI agent and a former employee at his
dental practice. However, for purposes of his case in front of the Supreme Court, the
charges of attempted murder were not an issue since they were not part of the
original case. This was significant in that it could have potentially weakened the
4

Id. at 239.

5

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

6

Harper, 494 U.S. at 226.

7
In a related case to Sell, the Court was presented with a question of whether it was
constitutional to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a defendant to render him
competent to stand trial. However, the Court overturned the lower court’s conviction due to a
lack of findings showing the defendant fell within the contours of the Harper test, not on the
grounds of the practice being unconstitutional. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
8

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
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government interest in prosecuting him, since fraud charges are traditionally viewed
as less serious than attempted murder charges and a finding of dangerousness is less
likely.
The first prong of the Sell test requires a court to “find that important
governmental interests are at stake.”9 Generally speaking, this is always satisfied
when the government is seeking to administer drugs to a criminal defendant. By
prosecuting him, the government is serving its role of protecting society’s basic need
for human security.10
While this interest in adjudication of the charges is always present, it can be
mitigated by other factors. For instance, an incompetent defendant who refuses to
take medication voluntarily will be confined for a significant period of time.11 While
this effect will not provide the per se equivalent benefit on society that adjudication
of criminal charges would, it nonetheless confers some benefit to society by keeping
potentially-criminal individuals off the streets. Also, the government interest can be
dissipated by the length of confinement a defendant will have already experienced as
a result of refusing the drugs.12 Lastly, the government’s interest in adjudication is
not an absolute one, as the government itself has a “concomitant, constitutionally
essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.”13 Therefore,
while the government always has a certified interest in adjudication of the charges
against the defendant, that interest can be reduced by other factors.
The second prong of the Sell test requires “the court [to] conclude that
involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests.”14
To satisfy this prong, the government must prove two things. First, it must show that
medication is “substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.”15
Second, it must show that the medication is “substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.”16 Justice Kennedy
pointed out the possible detrimental effects of the drugs on a defendant’s ability to
receive a fair trial by altering his demeanor in the courtroom, thus prejudicing the
presentation of his defense or leaving him unable or unwilling to assist his counsel in
presenting a defense.17 Therefore, any administration of antipsychotic medication
must avoid either of these side effects to pass this prong.
The third prong of the Sell test requires the “court to conclude that involuntary
medication is necessary to further those interests.”18 This requires the court to
9

Id. at 180 [emphasis in original].

10

Id. (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992)).

11

Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

12

Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 181 [emphasis in original].

15

Id.

16

Id.; see also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45.

17

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142.

18

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 [emphasis in original].
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consider alternatives, both substantive and procedural, to forcible administration of
the drugs. For substantive alternatives, while there is no consensus among the
scientific community as to the effectiveness of alternatives to medication, the court
must still consider them.19 Also, the court must consider procedural alternatives to
forcible medication, such as court orders backed with the threat of a contempt
finding.20 After consideration of these alternatives, the court must find that forcible
medication is the only means by which the government can achieve its interests.
The fourth prong of the Sell test requires that “the court must conclude that
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.”21 To satisfy this prong, the
government must show that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate for
each individual defendant and, moreover, his specific symptoms.22 This prong seeks
to ensure that whatever side effects the defendant may suffer (and considering the
available medications, dangerous side effects are very possible), they will be
outweighed by the benefits available to the defendant.
The Sell decision came more than a decade after the Court gave permission to the
government to forcibly administer drugs to inmates who were found to be dangerous
to themselves or others.23 However, Sell is distinguishable from these earlier cases
because of the government interest involved: making the defendant competent to
stand trial.24 This asserted government interest can be differentiated from the earlier
cases authorizing forced medication because it lacks a characteristic which was a
focal point of those earlier decisions: a finding that the defendant was dangerous.
B. Washington v. Harper
In Harper, the Court was confronted with the question of whether the
government could forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a prison inmate and
under what circumstances it would be constitutional to do so.25 In resolving the
issue, the Court held that an inmate’s right to be free from forced medication had to
be viewed in light of “the State’s interest in prison safety and security.”26

19
Id. (comparing “Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 10-14
(finding nondrug therapies may be effective in restoring psychotic defendants to competence);
but cf. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 13-22 (alternative
treatments for psychosis commonly not as effective as medication)”).
20

Id.

21

Id. [emphasis added].

22

Id.

23

Harper, 494 U.S. 210.

24

Issue of Sell presented as “whether the Constitution permits the Government to
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to
render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent crimes.” Sell, 539
U.S. at 170. Issue of Harper presented as “whether a judicial hearing is required before the
State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drug against his will.” Harper, 494
U.S. at 213.
25

Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.

26

Id. at 223.
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Harper dealt with a prison inmate who was originally convicted of robbery in
1976. Until 1980, he spent most of his time in the mental health unit of the
Washington State Penitentiary, where he voluntarily took the prescribed
antipsychotic medication, but eventually refused to continue taking it.27 His treating
physician then sought to forcibly administer the drugs pursuant to state policy.28 The
policy required that a psychiatrist determine whether an inmate should be medicated
with antipsychotic drugs. If the inmate refused to consent, he could only be
“subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs if he (1) suffers from a ‘mental
disorder’ and (2) is ‘gravely disabled’ or poses a ‘likelihood of serious harm’ to
himself, others, or their property.”29
Under the state policy, “gravely disabled” was summarily defined as a condition
in which a person was in danger of harming himself due to an inability to care for his
health and safety, or manifested serious deterioration in either cognitive or volitional
functioning and was a threat to lose control of the ability to care for himself as a
result. More importantly, likelihood of serious harm was defined as a
substantial risk that harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own
person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict
physical harm on one’s self, a substantial risk that physical harm will be
inflicted by an individual upon others, as evidenced by behavior which
has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in
reasonable fear of sustaining such harm, or a substantial risk that physical
harm will be inflicted by an individual upon property of others, as
evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the
property of others.30
Under this standard, the lower courts found that Harper posed a threat to himself
or to others,31 and the Court agreed with their findings.
The Court recognized that the inmate had a “right to be free from the arbitrary
administration of antipsychotic medication.”32 Further, the Court recognized that the
inmate possessed this right under both state law and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.33 However, in regard to the inmate’s right under state law,
this interest against unwanted medication was not absolute, and could be violated in

27

Id. at 214.

28

Id. The physician sought the medication under state policy SOC [Special Offender
Center]. SOC Policy 600.30.
29

Harper, 494 U.S. at 215.

30

Id. at 216 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §71.05.020(3)).

31

Harper, 494 U.S. at 217-18. The district court held that the procedures contained in the
state policy met the requirements previously prescribed by the Court in Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980), and therefore could be implemented despite the petitioner’s recognized
liberty interest.
32

Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.

33

Id. at 221-22.
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furtherance of a state interest.34 In the context of his right to avoid unwanted
medication under the Due Process Clause, the right was again found non-absolute,
and it could be violated if a state met the rigors of due process, which the
Washington Policy was found to do.35
In formulating its decision, the Court relied heavily on the state interest involved:
the interest in prison safety and security.36 It found that this specific interest carried
with it vast significance.37 With the magnitude of the state interest involved in mind,
the Court found that, “given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”38 The Court found
that by only treating dangerous inmates and only under circumstances in which it
was in their medical interests did the Washington State Policy meet these
requirements.39 Retrospectively, it is reasonable to conclude that the two most
important facets of this decision were the setting a prison environment and the fact
that the inmate was adjudged ‘dangerous’. In the line of cases that follows, these
characteristics serve to distinguish Harper.
C. Riggins v. Nevada
The Court again faced the issue of forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs
two years after Harper was decided.40 The posture of this case is more closely
analogous to that of Sell because the government sought to medicate forcibly the

34

“By permitting a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his
wishes only if he is found to be (1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous, the
policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be
administered [arbitrarily].” Id. at 221.
35

The policy under review requires the state to establish, by a medical finding, that a
mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated.
Moreover, the fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and
then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will
be ordered only if it is in the prisoner’s medical interests, given the legitimate needs of
his institutional confinement. These standards, which recognize both the prisoner’s
medical interests and the State’s interests, meet the demands of the Due Process
Clause.
Id. at 222-23.
36

Id. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
37
“There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the
governmental interest presented here. There are few cases in which the State’s interest in
combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison
environment, which, ‘by definition,’ is made up of persons with ‘a demonstrated proclivity for
antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.’” Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)).
38

Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.

39

Id.

40

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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defendant for purposes of rendering him competent to stand trial.41 However,
contrary to Sell, the Nevada Supreme Court authorized forced medication before the
defendant’s appeal was heard, and he was convicted as a result of his medicated
competence. In resolving the issue, the Court held that the conviction was tainted,
but not because any of the defendant’s liberty interests were violated, but because the
Nevada State Courts failed to make findings sufficient to support that conclusion.42
David Riggins was arrested and charged with murder in late 1987. Soon after
being arrested, it was apparent to treating physicians that he was suffering from
mental health problems. He was treated with antipsychotic medications for the next
few months at gradually increasing dosages.43 Finally, in early 1988, Riggins
successfully moved for a competence hearing. Riggins was interviewed by three
court-appointed psychiatrists, two of whom found him competent to stand trial, and
the District Court ruled him so competent.
The defendant further moved the District Court to suspend administration of the
drugs, claiming they interfered with his ability to present an insanity defense and
they would further interfere with his ability to assist counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.44 The District Court heard testimony from three different
psychiatrists in deciding Riggins’ motion. Of the three, two predicted that Riggins
would likely be competent to stand trial without medication. The third testified that
he could not predict what the effects of taking the defendant off medication would
produce, but added that the medication actually put him in a more relaxed state
(however, the excessive dosage he was currently on may not have been necessary).45
A fourth psychiatrist submitted an affidavit stating his belief that Riggins was
incompetent to stand trial even with the current medication and that taking him off of
it would likely lead him back to his “manifest psychosis and [make him] extremely
difficult to manage.”46
Subsequently, the District Court ruled against Riggins’ motion to terminate his
medication in a one-page order that “gave no indication of the court’s rationale.”47
Afterwards, Riggins continued on this high dosage48 of medication through trial,
where he was convicted of murder after presenting his insanity defense. Riggins
appealed his conviction and sentencing to the Nevada Supreme Court, but was
denied relief. The Court held that expert testimony to the jury adequately informed it

41

Id. at 133 (stating issue as “whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication
during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
42

Id. at 129.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 130.

45

Id. at 130-31.

46

Id. at 131.

47

Id.

48

“Dr. O’Gorman suggested that the dosage administered to Riggins was within the toxic
range and could make him ‘uptight.’ Dr. Master testified that a patient taking 800 milligrams
of Mellaril each day might suffer from drowsiness or confusion.” Id. at 137 (citations
omitted).
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of the potential prejudicial effects of Mellaril, curing any possibility of error in the
judgment.49
In overturning the conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court primarily relied on the
lack of adequate findings by the District Court regarding the necessity of forced
administration. “Because the record contains no finding that might support a
conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to
accomplish an essential state policy, we have no basis for saying that the substantial
probability of trial prejudice in this case was justified.”50 Although it framed the
issue as whether the forced administration of medication violated Riggins’ right to a
fair trial, the Court ostensibly avoided the question. Instead, the Court held that the
State had simply not met its burden of proof to show that the medication was
necessary, in light of the violation of Riggins liberty interest to be free from
unwanted medication.
In reaching its decision, the Court found that the State “certainly would have
satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had
found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety
or the safety of others.” 51 While the Court found that Riggins’ liberty interest in
being free of unwanted medication could have been permissibly violated under due
process with a showing by the State similar to that required in Harper, it also
intimated that weaker state interests could lead to non-voluntary medication, such as
lack of alternatives for adjudication of criminal charges52 (i.e., to render the
defendant competent to stand trial to face his charges). However, this statement is
properly viewed as dicta since the Court held for the defendant based on the
inadequate findings of the Nevada courts. Nonetheless, although merely dicta, the
Court’s intimation of lower standards by which to allow forced medication comports
with its ultimately imperfect treatment of the issue in Sell, which asks when it is
permissible for lower courts to authorize such forced medication and what standard
should be applied to claims against the medication.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
APPLIED BY VARYING COURTS
Substantive due process claims have traditionally received varied levels of
scrutiny when Courts decide if State actions are justified in light of the right
implicated. In theory, most substantive due process liberty claims come under one of
two levels of review: strict scrutiny or rational basis review.53 The application of
49

Id. at 132.

50

Id. at 138.

51

Id. at 135.

52

“Similarly, the state might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary
treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’
guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347
(1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).” Id.
53

See Sheldon Gelman, ‘Life’ and ‘Liberty’: Their Original Meaning, Historical
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV.
585, 693 (1994) (noting that most substantive due process liberties receive rational basis
review, while a few receive strict scrutiny).
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either test usually depends on the nature of the right advanced. If the right is found
to be a fundamental one, it will receive strict scrutiny, but most non-fundamental
rights receive the tempered rational review test. However, some rights, which come
under the purview of being fundamental, still receive a lower treatment than strict
scrutiny.54 This standard of review is commonly referred to as intermediate, or
heightened, scrutiny.
Under the different standards, the importance of the state interest involved
necessarily must vary with the scrutiny applied. If the right is not a fundamental
right, courts are usually very deferential because the basic requirement of the state
action in that context is that it rationally reflect some public policy.55 However, if
the right is a fundamental one, courts will tolerate only very little interference with
the right, and the interference must be necessary to meet a compelling state interest.56
In fact, classification as a fundamental right and implementation of the strict scrutiny
test is sometimes referred to as “fatal in fact.”57 Furthermore, in the space between
these two levels lies the intermediate scrutiny test, whose requirements continue to
evolve and typically vary depending on the right and the state interest. In this
intermediate zone, essential state interests, that would normally be rejected under the
strict scrutiny standard when in conflict with an individual’s fundamental liberty
right, are able to find intermittent justification.58
To resolve properly the issue of whether a state practice conflicts with an asserted
liberty right of an individual, then, two preliminary questions must be answered:
what exactly is the protected right asserted by the individual, and what is the state
interest sought to be advanced through the government conduct? While in theory,
once the question of whether a right is fundamental is resolved (i.e., if it is found to
be fundamental, the government conduct must meet the strict scrutiny standard and
will likely fail to do so), in practice the state interest involved can sometimes work to
assuage the importance of the fundamental right asserted by the defendant.
Therefore, defining these two variables helps shape what level of scrutiny must be

54
See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 315 (1993) (“not every restriction of a right
classified as fundamental incurs ‘strict’ scrutiny”). Fallon notes that fundamental rights such
as marriage (Zablocki v. Redhail, (434 U.S. 374 (1978)), and the right to an abortion (Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, (505 U.S. 883 (1992)), have been protected by levels of scrutiny less
than strict. This transpiration is seen across a wide spectrum of constitutional liberties when
the state manifests some act to infringe those liberties.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998) (citing Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972)).
58
See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 317 (1993) (listing the various cases
involving impinged liberty rights wherein “the Supreme Court has appeared to engage in an ad
hoc balancing of ‘the liberty [interest] of the individual’ against ‘the demands of an organized
society’”. Such cases include confinement in mental institutions and the right to travel).
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applied and whether the government interest is legitimate in light of the individual’s
right sought to be protected.59
A. U.S. Supreme Court in Harper
The Court in Harper reviewed the state conduct in question under a reasonable
relation standard. In doing so, the Court afforded considerable weight to the fact that
the conduct in question was related to state penological interests. By framing the
issue60 in terms of the State’s legitimate interests in penological affairs, though, the
Court significantly downplayed what is an accepted liberty interest of the prisoner.61
While this test is not of the traditional reasonable relation standard,62 and could be
considered more closely tailored to a rational relation with bite test, it is far from a
strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny standard traditionally afforded to fundamental
liberty interests. The overriding justification and reason for the outcome of the
holding is the state interest invoked: the penological system.
The Court’s focus on the particular state interest involved stems from its
treatment of cases involving prisoner’s rights that face serious jeopardy in light of
prison regulations enacted by the State.63 “The legitimacy, and the necessity, of
considering the State’s interests in prison safety and security are well established by
our cases. In Turner v. Safley, and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, we held that the
proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to
infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”64 Furthermore, the Court
wrote that this is the proper test to apply “even when the constitutional right claimed
to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances
would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review.”65
Therefore, the Court used precedent from cases in which non-fundamental rights are
implicated (which would involve rationally related standards of review) to analyze
cases in which fundamental rights are implicated66 (which, presumably, should
59

Harper, 494 U.S. at 220 (‘“The substantive issue involves a definition of the protected
constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state
interests might outweigh it.’”) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)).
60

“The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is required before the State
may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will.” Harper, 494 U.S
at 213 (working on the assumption that the State’s entitlement to administer such drugs in the
first place necessarily downplays the significance of the liberty right asserted).
61

Id. at 221-22 (recognizing a prisoner’s significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under both state law and the Due Process
Clause). See generally Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (assuming that individuals have a
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication and exploring the case law
history of that assumption).
62
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (reasonable
relation essentially means any government interest will justify the action).
63

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

64

Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citations omitted).

65

Id.

66

See note 68, infra.
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invoke a more stringent standard of review). By focusing on the state interests
involved (penological interests) as opposed to the defendant’s interest (liberty
interest in being free of forced medication), the Court invoked a non-fundamental
right standard of review.
In articulating the scrutiny applied in matters involving penological interests, the
Court reviewed the precedent from which this standard arose. This review served to
reinforce the history of reasonable relation with bite standard, but in making such a
review, the Court again failed to consider exactly the right implicated, focusing
instead on the state interests advanced. Many of the rights, though certainly
important, should not be put on a par with the right to be free from unwanted
medication since that medication can fundamentally alter the composition of the
person given the drugs.67
The cases relied on by the Court to substantiate its reasonable relation with bite
standard invoked important rights, but none involved an alteration of that prisoner’s
being.68 In fact, the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply the reasonable
relation standard of review and distinguished the Turner line of cases because
Harper’s interest was distinguishable from the First Amendment rights asserted in
those earlier cases. It is, of course, somewhat speculative to try and determine which
rights are more important, but the Court in Harper brushed off any consideration of
the issue and lumped all the rights together.
Instead of adopting a rule tailored to the individual rights asserted, the Court
grouped all constitutionally asserted rights under one heading when in the face of
penological state interests.69 In doing so, the Court concerned itself more with the
possibility of a procedural due process violation, as opposed to a substantive due
process violation, effectively glossing over the issue. “[T]he substantive issue is what
factual circumstances must exist before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs
to the prisoner against his will; the procedural issue is whether the state’s nonjudicial
mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular caser are sufficient.”70
Couching the substantive issue in terms of what facts must exist before it is
permissible to administer forcibly the drugs ignores the possibility of such
administration being violative of the recipient’s right to bodily integrity.
B. Nevada Supreme Court in Riggins
The Nevada Supreme Court, in reviewing Riggins’ appeal, held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the forced administration of the
67

See INTRODUCTION, supra, and note 68, infra.

68

See Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (prisoner’s right to marry); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (right of prisoners’ union to organize and selfgovern); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (right to be interviewed by media and
selection process imposed in media selections); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (right to
single rooms, receive mail, procedures of shakedowns); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (right to uncensored mail and access to law students); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987) (right to exercise religious acts).
69
“We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all
circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”
Harper, 494 U.S. at 224.
70

Id. at 220.
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antipsychotic drugs.71 Riggins claimed that the District Court abused its discretion
since continuing administration of the drugs would prohibit Riggins from properly
presenting his insanity defense.72 However, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
administration of the drugs was not an abuse of discretion since Riggins could
present expert testimony at trial to instruct the jury as to possible side effects of the
drugs, and doing so would cure any prejudice. By reaching this conclusion, the court
implicitly adopted the reasonable relation standard because it never discussed the
possibility that Riggins had some fundamental right against forced administration of
the drugs which the State could only violate to meet some compelling consideration.
In making these findings, the court relied on the findings of the District Court
judge, which were embodied in “a one-page order that gave no indication of the
court’s rationale.”73 In fact, the Supreme Court decision speculated that the District
Court ordered the continued medication solely for fear that Riggins would otherwise
become incompetent. “Were we to divine the District Court’s logic from the hearing
transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the
defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the
chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the
balance in favor of involuntary medication.”74 The Court’s review of the Nevada
Supreme Court decision confirmed the lower court’s application of the reasonable
relation standard, since it approved administration of the drugs solely in order to try
Riggins. Although the Supreme Court itself speculated that this justification may be
a sufficient enough reason to stick with the forced administration,75 it ultimately
decided, as opposed to the Nevada Supreme Court, that the present findings are not
compelling enough to continue the forced administration.
One Nevada Supreme Court judge concurred in the decision, although he wrote
separately to note that, in the future, criminal defendants in Riggins’ shoes should be
taken off medication before trial to determine whether they would remain competent.
If they reverted to incompetency, then-and only then-would re-administration of the
drugs be appropriate.76 It appears this judge was comfortable with the reasonable
relation standard but wished to add some bite to the procedural protections that come
with it.
Also, one Nevada Supreme Court Justice dissented, arguing that forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs against criminal defendants was never
appropriate to meet the State interest of adjudication of criminal charges.77 While it
is unclear what level of review this Justice wished to implement, it is clear the
reasonable relation standard was not sufficient.
71

Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1991).

72

Id. at 537-38.

73

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 131 (1992).

74

Id. at 137 (citing Record 502 (“[T]hat he was nervous and so forth . . . can all be brought
out [through expert testimony]. And when you start weighing the consequences of taking him
off his medication and possibly have him revert into an incompetent situation, I don’t think
that that is a good experiment”).
75

See note 84, infra.

76

Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d at 539-40 (Rose, J., concurring).

77

Id. at 540-43 (Springer, J., dissenting).
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C. U.S. Supreme Court in Riggins
The Court in Riggins failed to explicitly proscribe a substantive test.78 Based on
that, it is unclear whether the Court would advocate a reasonable relation test or a
heightened scrutiny test. The Court essentially compared Riggins’ case to Harper’s,
equating pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners.79 Based on that comparison, it
would appear as though a rational relation with bite test would be invoked.80
However, based on the language the Court used,81 such as “less intrusive
alternatives” and ‘overriding justification’, the Court sketched a test more closely
analogous to that of heightened scrutiny.82
To pass the prescribed test, the State had to at least meet the test laid out in
Harper in order to administer forcibly antipsychotic drugs to Riggins. “Nevada
certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and
the District Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the
sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”83 Nevada would have been able
to administer the drugs if it had shown that Riggins presented a danger, or could
have been coined a “dangerous” person (assuming the government could have met
the threshold requirement of showing the medical appropriateness of the drugs.
Riggins never challenged its appropriateness in court). Under the reasonably related
standard, this governmental interest sufficiently outweighed Riggins’ interest in
freedom from bodily intrusion to make it constitutionally permissible to administer
the drugs forcibly.
Also significant was the next justification, which the Court suggested would have
allowed Nevada to forcibly administer the drugs. “Similarly, the State might have
been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by
establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by

78

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133-36.

79
Id. at 135 (“Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is
impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons
the State detains for trial”); see also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (“[P]retrial
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights
that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners”).
80

As contrasted with note 62, supra, the traditional “anything goes” rational relation test.

81

See Riggins, 504 U.S. 135 (using language such as “forcing antipsychotic drugs on a
convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness”; also commenting that Nevada may have satisfied
their burden of proof had the District Court found “that treatment with antipsychotic
medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for
the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others”).
82
See Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eighth Circuit is Sell-ing: United States v.
Sell, and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees
Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 690-94 (2003).
83

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
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using less intrusive means.”84 This justification would move away from the
previously accepted ones outlined in Harper (dangerousness of defendant or danger
posed to those around him), because it would allow administration of drugs solely
based on the government’s interest in adjudication of the case.
Even assuming that some degree of scrutiny beyond reasonable relation is
employed in these challenges, the Court’s dicta here adds strength to the state’s
argument that it should be allowed to forcibly medicate individual’s in Riggins’
position, and would thus prevail under some form of heightened scrutiny. The chief
“less intrusive means” would likely be to stop medicating Riggins and try him,
whether he is competent or not. However, neither Riggins nor the State argued that
he could be tried after cessation of the medication,85 if it rendered him incompetent,
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of prosecuting incompetents casts doubt on
that possibility.86 Therefore, this dicta adds credence to the State’s argument for
forced medication because no “less intrusive means” will result in adjudication of the
case.
The Court also took explicit exception to the dissent’s contention that it was
adapting a strict scrutiny standard.87 Rather, it justified its holding on the grounds
that the lower courts in Nevada failed to make any findings sufficient to meet the
reasonable relation standard. The Court noted that it did not have “occasion to
finally prescribe such substantive standards as mentioned above, since the District
Court allowed administration of Mellaril to continue without making any
determination of the need for this course or any findings about reasonable
alternatives.”88
Rather than outlining the correct legal standard for forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants, the Court used the bare minimum
requirements of the reasonable relation test in Harper (in which the defendant’s
inmate status was so heavily relied upon), to establish that Nevada had not met those
standards in the present case. Essentially, the Court held that whatever the true
standard may be, Nevada did not meet it here. The Court overturned the Nevada
decision because of a lack of findings as to what governmental interest was being
submitted that would outweigh the defendant’s liberty interest.89 More, the Court
84

Id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered
liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and peace”)).
85
The Court noted that Riggins did not argue that he should have been allowed to refuse
the medication and be tried, even if by refusal he was incompetent to stand trial. Riggins, 504
U.S. at 136.
86
“[C]onviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process.” Id. at 139 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
87

“Contrary to the dissent’s understanding, we do not ‘adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.’”
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136.
88

Id.

89

“[W]e would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the defense
would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the chance that
Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the balance in favor of
involuntary medication.” Id. at 136.
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noted that the lower court “did not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest in
freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.”90 Rather than clearly putting any teeth
into the appropriate standard of review in forced antipsychotic administration cases,
the Court found that Nevada simply failed to meet the toothless reasonable relation
standard already in existence.91
Justice Kennedy, author of the Court’s opinion in Harper, wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment in Riggins.92 Justice Kennedy’s primary concern
with this case was his belief that antipsychotic drugs “pose[d] a serious threat to a
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”93 He further noted his belief that “absent an
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting
officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for
purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial . . . and [I] doubt that showing
can be made in most cases.”94
Justice Kennedy’s reference to an “extraordinary showing” alludes to his
acceptance of a higher standard than the reasonable relation standard that he
authored in Harper. He later distinguished Harper in his concurrence,95 noting that
different rights were implicated. What is unclear is whether Justice Kennedy’s
reservations about the present administration of drugs stem more from the absence of
a ‘dangerousness’ element in Riggins, or whether it is because this case implicates
the rights of pre-trial criminal defendants, as opposed to already incarcerated
individuals. Whatever the motivating factor behind Justice Kennedy’s vote, it is
clear that he advocates a higher standard of review in cases of forced administration
of antipsychotic drugs to pre-trial criminal defendants when that defendant is not
considered ‘dangerous’.
D. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sell
In reviewing Sell’s appeal, the Eighth Circuit purported to adopt a heightened
scrutiny standard of review but declined to accept Sell’s recommended strict scrutiny
approach.96 While rejecting the magistrate’s findings that Sell was dangerous, both

90

Id. at 137.

91

Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized the fact that the District Court denied
Riggins’ motion to terminate the medication in a one-page order which did not explain the
court’s rationale whatsoever. It was more this lack of explanation and findings that doomed
Nevada, not the eventual impropriety of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.
92

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-45.

93

Id. at 138.

94

Id. at 139.

95

“This is not a case like Washington v. Harper in which the purpose of the involuntary
medication was to ensure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to
himself or others . . . . Here the purpose of the medication is not merely to treat a person with
grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to function and behave in a way not
dangerous to himself or others, but rather to render the person competent to stand trial.” Id. at
140 (citations omitted).
96
United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Like our sister courts, we
believe that we must apply some sort of heightened standard of review, but unlike the Sixth
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the district and appellate courts still came to the conclusion that forcible
administration of drugs was appropriate because the state fulfilled the alluded-to
criteria in the Riggins’ decision. In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on
the dicta in the Riggins decision, as the two were factually similar in so far as neither
defendant was considered to be dangerous. However, by adopting the dicta in
Riggins as its holding, the Eighth Circuit ignored an essential element of the Court’s
jurisprudence in forcible administration of medication; either the existence of a
dangerous propensity in the defendant or a state interest in penological institutions.
In framing the issue before it, the Eighth Circuit asked whether the district court
was correct in authorizing forced administration of drugs simply for trial competence
purposes.97 To answer this question, the court framed a three-prong test for the
government to pass in order to forcibly administer the medication.
Based on the Supreme Court decisions in Riggins and Harper . . . we hold
that the government must meet the following test in order for the
government to forcibly medicate an individual. First, the government
must present an essential state interest that outweighs the individual’s
interest in remaining free from medication. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135
(noting that the government must prove an overriding state interest).
Second, the government must prove that there is no less intrusive way of
fulfilling its essential interest. See id. Third, the government must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the medication is medically
appropriate. See id. Medication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely
to render the patient competent, see Weston, 255 F.3d at 876; (2) the
likelihood and gravity of side effects do not overwhelm its benefits, see
id.; and (3) it is in the best medical interests of the patient. See Harper,
494 U.S. at 227 (noting that the court should consider the petitioner's
medical interest).98
Further, the court stated that the district court failed to analyze the case under this
test, so it would review the court’s findings to determine if the government had
fulfilled its burden of proof.99
Under the first prong, the court held that the government had a significant interest
in adjudication of the charges against Sell.100 The court recognized, however, that
not all charges would be serious enough to justify such an intrusion of one’s liberty.
Rather, the charges must be serious in nature.101 Then, in a cursory manner, the court

Circuit, we do not adopt the strict scrutiny standard”) (citing United States v. Weston, 255
F.3d 873, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998)).
97

Sell, 282 F.3d at 562.

98

Id. at 567.

99

Id. at 567-68.

100

Id. at 568 (“The government has an essential interest in brining a defendant to trial”)
(citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
101
The seriousness of the charges that would qualify a defendant for forced administration
of drugs is the principal point of dissent by Judge Bye. Charges of a more serious nature, such
as murder or attempted murder (e.g., Weston, 225 F.3d at 881) are what that Judge thought the
Supreme Court was alluding to when it outlined the test to which the present court was
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decided that Sell’s present charges were serious enough to override his significant
liberty interest in being free of medication.102
In deciding whether there were any less intrusive means by which to meet the
essential government interest outlined above, the court found that without restoring
Sell to competence, the government could not try him on these serious charges.103
The court further noted that Sell’s psychiatrist even admitted that no remedy for
returning Sell to competence existed outside administration of the drugs.104
Although this conclusion is not wholly unreasonable, the court failed to consider
other alternatives available to the government, for instance court orders to take the
medication backed by a threat of contempt.105 Perhaps if the court had followed this
course, Sell would have eventually consented to the medication, thus providing the
state the opportunity to prosecute him and at the same time allowing Sell to retain
some dignity by not having these powerful drugs injected forcibly, but rather injected
by way of a conscious choice. Instead, though, the court makes another cursory
conclusion that the only way to adjudicate Sell is to administer drugs, forcibly or not.
The third prong required the government to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the medication was medically appropriate, by ensuring that it would
likely restore competence, that the side effects likely would not outweigh the
benefits, and that it was in the best medical interests of the patient.106 In deciding
this issue, the court noted that both parties presented considerable expert testimony at
trial supporting each one’s view.107 Despite the differing points of view, though, the
purporting to adhere. Money laundering and fraud charges are not what he thought the Court
had in mind.
102
Sell 282 F.3d at 568. The court stated its belief that not all charges would be serious
enough to warrant forced medication. However, it stated that the present charges are serious
enough. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court reached this conclusion based on the
nature of the charges (fraud and money-laundering) or whether the court relied on the quantity
of the charges (62 charges of fraud and one charge of money-laundering). While it’s possible
the court could have viewed fraud and money-laundering as serious enough to merit forced
medication, the more reasonable conclusion is that the court viewed the volume of the charges
as the dispositive factor. Without more elaboration, though, it’s impossible to tell. Reliance
on such a factor sets a dangerous precedent for future overly-zealous prosecutors seeking to
create a synthetically competent defendant and to give him every incentive to ‘throw the book’
at the person in custody. The more charges they can eventually add, the better chance the
government would have of medicating a defendant forcibly, even absent a dangerousness
element in the person’s character.
103

Id.

104

Id. (“Even Dr. Cloninger, who submitted an affidavit on behalf of Sell and stated that
antipsychotic drugs are not a proven treatment, did not suggest any alternative means of
restoring competency”).
105

Perhaps this idea was not proposed prior to the Supreme Court Sell decision, but it is
one specifically adopted by the Court upon review.
106

Id. at 567.

107

The government presented two witnesses to show the medication to be appropriate. The
first, Dr. DeMier, was Sell’s treating psychologist. He stated that antipsychotic medication
was the only means by which to restore Sell to competency and that he previously treated two
patients with such medication, one of whom was effectively restored (with the other not
regaining competence, but “improving”). Dr. DeMier also acknowledged that serious side
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court stated “we do not believe that the district court committed clear error in finding
that the government proved medical appropriateness by clear and convincing
evidence.”108 Rather than submitting its own belief on the appropriateness of the
medication under its prescribed test, the court relied on a deferential view that the
lower court did not commit reversible error,109 reminiscent of the Riggins holding
where the Court found that Nevada simply hadn’t met their burden of proof. Instead
of relying on this deferential review, the court could have performed a more exacting
review of the record to determine whether the medication was in fact appropriate.
In sum, the Eighth Circuit facially applied a heightened scrutiny test. The test it
outlines would be one of heightened scrutiny, yet Sell lost his appeal. In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied heavily on the lack of any reasonable alternatives
towards adjudication of the case against Sell. Due to its heavy reliance on the state
interest of adjudication of the case against Sell, the court underestimated the
significance of Sell’s liberty interest to be free from unwanted medication; this
approach is similar to the Court’s tunneled-view in Harper of the overriding need for
penological safety, when compared to the inmate’s fundamental right to be free from
unwanted medication.
A true heightened scrutiny standard would accord greater weight to the
defendant’s interest to be free from medication, and require more state interest than
the dire need of the government to adjudicate such serious charges as fraud and
money-laundering. Furthermore, it would require a far greater showing by the
government of the third prong of its own test: that the medication was truly
appropriate. While it creates a number of sub-categories through which the
government could carry its clear and convincing burden of proof, a generous reading
of the record shows that both sides presented credible evidence from which a
conclusion supporting Sell’s, or the government’s, argument could legitimately be
drawn. Therefore, while called a heightened scrutiny standard, the Eighth Circuit’s
test should be viewed more as a reasonably related with bite standard.
E. U.S. Supreme Court in Sell
The Court in Sell effectively adopted a heightened scrutiny standard of review for
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs for pre-trial criminal defendants who
are not dangerous. Without explicitly adopting this standard, the Court in effect did
so. Reviewing the history of both Harper and Riggins, the Court stated that it would

effects could occur as a result of the medication (see INTRODUCTION, supra). Dr. Wolfson, a
psychiatrist who treated Sell, also testified that three out of four patients he had treated with
antipsychotic medication were restored to competency. Dr. Wolfson too acknowledged that
patients could develop serious side effects from the medication, namely sedation, neuroleptic
malignant syndrome, tardive dyskinesia, and dystonic reaction. In response, Sell presented
two witnesses who testified that there existed no evidence that use of antipsychotic medication
was effective for treatment of Sell’s symptoms. Both witnesses admitted, though, that they
could not recommend any better forms of medication, which the Eighth Circuit stressed in its
ruling.
108

Id. at 570.

109

Id. at 570-71.
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be constitutionally permissible to administer psychotropic drugs forcibly, but only in
limited circumstances.110
The Court found that forced administration of the drugs would be appropriate
only if: (1) important governmental interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication
will significantly further those government interests; (3) involuntary medication is
necessary to further those governmental interests; and (4) administration of the drugs
is medically appropriate.111
The Court emphasized that this test should only be employed when the State is
seeking to forcibly medicate the defendant solely for trial competence purposes.112
The Court encouraged lower courts [before administering this Sell-test] to administer
different tests for forced administration, namely Harper-type tests to render a
dangerous person non-dangerous.113 If nothing else, the Court held, the findings of
these different tests will provide answers on the ultimate ‘administration solely for
competence’ test the Court presently advocates.114 Further, by requiring lower courts
to consider alternatives, the Court is sending a message that less intrusive means
should at least be considered.
In deciding the present case, the Court relied heavily on the District Court
findings, and the ultimate agreement with those findings by the Appellate Court, that
Sell was not dangerous.115 Grudgingly accepting these findings, the Court found that
forced administration solely for trial competence purposes was impermissible.
However, this holding is more analogous to the Riggins decision, where the Court
found a lack of justifiable lower court findings to administer the drugs, rather than an
outright violation of Sell’s liberty interest.
[W]e must assume that Sell was not dangerous. And on that hypothetical
assumption, we find that the Court of Appeals was wrong to approve
forced medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial. For one
thing, the Magistrate’s opinion makes clear that he did not find forced
110
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs
solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare”).
111

Id. at 180-81.

112

Id. at 181-82.

113

Id. (“A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for [trial
competence only], if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose such as the
purposes set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the
individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk. There are
often strong reasons for a court to determine whether the forced administration of drugs can be
justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question”)
(emphasis in original).
114

Id. at 183 (“Even if a court decides medication cannot be authorized on the alternative
grounds, the findings underlying such a decision will help to inform expert opinion and
judicial decisionmaking in respect to a request to administer drugs for trial competence
purposes”).
115

Sell, 539 U.S. at 184 (“We shall assume that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion about
Sell’s dangerousness was correct. But we make that assumption only because the Government
did not contest, and the parties have not argued, that particular matter. If anything the record
before us, described in Part I, suggests the contrary.”) (emphasis in original).
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medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone. Rather,
the Magistrate concluded that Sell was dangerous, and he wrote that
forced medication was “the only way to render the defendant not
dangerous and competent to stand trial.”116
The Court in Sell did adopt a heightened scrutiny standard, making it more
difficult for the State to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs. It creates a narrow
window of forced administration, but only when the defendant in question is not a
dangerous person. Further, by painstakingly pointing out that for purposes of the
present case, the Court was acting on the ‘hypothetical assumption’ that Sell was not
a dangerous person, the Court weakens its resolve in forbidding this practice.
Of these five different cases in five different courts, only the most recent case at
the Supreme Court applied anything that truly resembled a heightened scrutiny
standard. With that being said, the shame of Sell is that heightened scrutiny applies
very narrowly, with a group of loopholes allowing the government to get back closer
to the rational review with bite standards.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Dangerousness as the Dispositive Element and Chief Loophole
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sell facially makes it more difficult for the
government to administer drugs forcibly to a certain class of individuals, the
practical effect of the ruling will be limited.117 In fact, the effect of the opinion will
be just that: provide protection to a narrow group of individuals (non-dangerous, pretrial detainees refusing to accept medication who are not charged with a violent
crime) under a narrow set of circumstances. The main impetus for this phenomenon
of limited protection is the Court’s distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous
individuals.118 Furthermore, the Court does not proscribe any test for lower courts to
use when trying to decide a person’s dangerousness.119 Inapposite to such a standard,
the Court leaves it within the discretion of the lower courts to decide whether a
person is dangerous.120
116

Id. at 185 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

117

The Court itself acknowledged this will be the case since it carefully framed the issue as
“Whether the Constitution permits the Government to administer antipsychotic drugs
involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant—in order to render that defendant competent
to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. In fact, the Court
answered this question affirmatively, albeit with pretty strict limitations. More significant
than the affirmative response, though, is the narrowness of the rule. Government agencies
should be able to distinguish easily this fact pattern by showing that a defendant is in fact
dangerous, or maybe even simply by showing that the charges the individual faces are more
serious than money laundering and fraud. Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent this
effective prohibition will stretch to.
118

Harper, 494 U.S. at 216.

119

Each jurisdiction will have a different test or measurement to determine a person’s
“dangerousness,” but a typical example can be seen in note 30, supra. Moreover, a federal test
would eventually have to be prescribed, at least to be applied in federal jurisdictions.
120
“We shall assume that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion about Sell’s dangerousness was
correct. But we make that assumption only because the Government did not contest, and the
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The importance of this dangerousness question cannot be overstated. Much as
application of strict scrutiny is often ‘fatal in fact,’121 the question of whether a
person is found dangerous will also likely be dispositive of the adjudication of a
case. First, the Court notes that before adjudication of forced administration on the
grounds presented in Sell whether to forcibly medicate a person solely for trial
competence purposes is presented, the Court advised that lower courts should ask
whether forced medication can be justified on other grounds.122 Only after finding
that the individual cannot justifiably be medicated due to his ‘dangerousness’ should
the court consider whether it be permissible it to medicate for trial competence
purposes. Therefore, faced with a gaping loophole in the Court’s heightened
scrutiny against forcible medication, government agencies will likely do all they can
to show that a defendant is in fact ‘dangerous,’ thereby circumventing the Court’s
stricter version of the test and forcibly medicating the individual on these
“alternative grounds.”123 To gauge properly the variety by which future lower courts
may reach this dispositive dangerousness question, a review of applicable lower
court findings is appropriate.
The dangerousness findings in Sell resulted from his relationship with a nurse at
the hospital he was confined in. Essentially, Sell fell in love with the nurse and
became infatuated with her.124 There were further facts about Sell making threats
against witnesses who planned to testify against him, but this became a moot point
once Sell was confined in the medical center. Therefore, all dangerousness findings
presented to the courts were based on this infatuation with a nurse.
Throughout the litigative course of Sell, a total of fourteen judges reviewed the
case.125 Of these judges, at least three clearly found that Sell was not dangerous; the
district court judge and two of the appellate court judges stated so.126 On the other
parties have not argued, that particular matter. If anything, the record before us, described in
Part I, suggests the contrary.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 184. Justice Breyer’s reluctance to accept the
dangerousness findings of the district and appellate courts will only muddy the waters for
future determination of ‘dangerousness’ findings.
121

Fallon, supra note 58.

122

“A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of purpose,
if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose such as the purposes set out in
Harper related to individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual’s own
interests where refusal to take drug puts his health gravely at risk. There are often strong
reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on
these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question.” Sell, 539 U.S. at
181-82.
123

Id. at 182.

124

Id. at 172-73 (“In July 1999, Sell had approached one of the Medical Center’s nurses,
suggested that he was in love with her, criticized her for having nothing to do with him, and
when told that his behavior was inappropriate, added, ‘I can’t help it.’”) (citations omitted).
Doctors testifying about this incident concluded that it was unlikely that behavior like Sells’ in
this instance would stop anytime soon and, on that basis, decided he was ‘dangerous’ even
within the institution.
125

Id.; United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).

126

Sell, 539 U.S. at 174 (“The majority [of the Court of Appeals] affirmed the District
Court’s determination that Sell was not dangerous. The majority noted that, according to the
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hand, at least two, and ostensibly seven, judges found Sell to be dangerous. The
magistrate judge originally authorizing the forced medication clearly stated so,127 and
Justice Breyer wrote that “the record before us, described in Part I, suggests that
[Sell was dangerous].”128 The fact that Justice Breyer wrote the opinion of the Court,
in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, Rehnquist, and Stevens silently
agreed, suggests that all those Justices would have found Sell to be dangerous.
Furthermore, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas dissented in the opinion129
(albeit on jurisdictional grounds), but one must suspect they would be inclined to
give great deference to a dangerousness finding by lower courts. Therefore, even
under the announced requirements of Sell authorizing forced administration of drugs
on non-dangerous individuals, the Justices writing the opinion would have applied it
differently in their own case, finding him dangerous and forcibly medicating him on
those grounds.130
In Harper, the Court found that the defendant was in fact dangerous. The
defendant in that case had previously assaulted two nurses.131 All judges reviewing
the case in the Washington judicial system agreed that Harper was in fact dangerous.
On the Supreme Court, a majority agreed that Harper was dangerous. This finding is
more reasonable than that reached in Sell since it involved physical acts of violence.
However, even under this holding, review of the particular acts of violence leading to
the “dangerous” designation should be reviewed carefully.
In Riggins, the issue of Riggins’ level of dangerousness was not directly litigated
and was in fact the reason for the Nevada Court reversal.132 Had the State brought
any evidence to show that Riggins was in fact dangerous or posed a threat of
danger,133 he would likely have been forcibly medicated.134 If nothing else, this
District Court, Sell’s behavior at the Medical Center amounted at most to an ‘inappropriate
familiarity and even an infatuation with a nurse’. The Court of Appeals agreed, ‘[u]pon
review,’ that ‘the evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or
others at the Medical Center.”) (citations omitted).
127

Id. at 185 (“[T]he Magistrate’s opinion makes clear that he did not find forced
medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone. Rather, the Magistrate
concluded that Sell was dangerous, and he wrote that forced medication was ‘the only way to
render the defendant not dangerous and competent to stand trial’”) (citations omitted).
128

Id. at 184.

129

Id. at 186-93.

130
The equivalent of Sell’s dangerous conduct would be asking someone out on a date. Cf.
note 124. While it may have made the nurse uncomfortable and certainly could be described
as inappropriate, basing a finding of a person being ‘dangerous’ which ultimately results in
that person being forcibly administered antipsychotic medication with a (albeit slim) chance of
death, hardly seems justified.
131

Harper, 494 U.S. at 214.

132

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127.

133

For instance, becoming infatuated with a prison guard.

134

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 (“Because the record contains no finding that might support a
conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an
essential state policy, however, we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of
trial prejudice in this case was justified”).
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highlights the dispositive effect of a dangerousness determination. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion does not rule out that Riggins could have been medicated had he
been found dangerous or if the charges against him were serious enough to warrant
it.135 Further, Justice Kennedy specifically distinguished Harper, where he found
that the forced administration was primarily justified due to dangerousness, and left
that standing in good form.136 Since Sell, though, now someone in Riggins’ situation
faces a possibility of being forcibly medicated even absent a showing of present
dangerousness if they committed a “violent crime.”137
In cases decided since Sell was handed down, the murky waters haven’t appeared
to clear up yet. In United States v. Kourey,138 a court found that grounds existed to
forcibly medicate the defendant on Harper-type grounds,139 as he posed a threat. The
court reached these findings based on the physical appearance of the defendant at a
competency hearing and the testimony of a psychiatrist who cursorily found the
defendant to pose a threat. Similarly, in United States v. Colon,140 a court relied on
the findings of a psychiatrist who found the defendant dangerous. The psychiatrist
based these findings on the nature of the defendant’s mental illness, but not on any
specific instances of violence or acts presenting dangerous tendencies.141
That these two lower court opinions failed to authorize forced medication
highlights the uncertainty of this area of law. Even though the courts found
justifiable reasons for forcibly medicating the respective defendants, they declined to
take such action. Instead, they relied on Sell’s recommendation that other courses of
action be taken before the government may forcibly medicate. Whether these
holdings ultimately result in the defendant being medicated or not is unclear, and is
in fact one of the problems with Sell. It leaves lower courts and government
agencies with alternatives to forced medication,142 but many government agencies
135
Id. at 127-28 (“Due process certainly would have been satisfied had the State shown
that the treatment was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others . . . . However, the trial court allowed
the drug’s administration to continue without making any determination of the need for this
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives, and it failed to acknowledge Riggins’
liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic drugs.”)
136

Id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

137

Riggins was convicted of murder and robbery, and Sell specifically applies to nonviolent offenses only.
138

United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.W.Va. 2003).

139
Even though the court found these grounds to exist, the court deferred such
administration on procedural grounds, rather than on substantive due process grounds. Id.
140

United States v. Colon, 2003 WL 21730603 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2003).

141

Even though this court found the defendant to be dangerous, it ordered the parties in the
case to proceed down other avenues before it would consent to forcibly medicating the
individual. Id.
142
When the government is trying to forcibly medicate an individual, the court can first
threaten the defendant with a finding of contempt if he refuses to take voluntarily the
medication; the court can also formally commit the defendant (which, in Justice Blackmun’s
opinion, was the proper thing to do. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 236-37 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
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and lower courts will not want to deal with these delays. Instead, to save time, these
agencies and courts may go right for adjudication of the case through obtaining
synthetic competence of the defendant, which, after Sell, they are permitted to do
once they establish an individual’s dangerousness.
Based on the holding in Sell, and the substantial dicta evidencing the Court’s
opinion that Sell was in fact a “dangerous” person, and the subsequent lower court
treatments of the dangerous issue, it is clear that whether a person is considered
dangerous will be fatal in fact to that person’s liberty interest to stay free of
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.143
B. State Interest Provides Second Loophole
One of the most glaring questions to be answered in subsequent litigation, then, is
whether the Harper rational review with bite test or Sell’s heightened scrutiny test is
the proper one to apply. As shown earlier, the presence of a dangerousness element
in the defendant could likely render this point moot, but beyond that assumption, an
argument could be made that the determining factor for the court to weigh is what
the state interest is. Harper involved penological interests, which have been said to
override even fundamental liberty interests.144 When, like in Sell, the state is simply
trying to administer the drugs to meet the state interest of adjudication of a nonviolent criminal case, the importance of their interest may diminish. Conversely, if
the state seeks to prosecute an individual for the commission of violent felonies, its
interest in adjudication may grow with stature.
This distinction in classes or seriousness of crimes ultimately provides another
loophole for forced administration of antipsychotic medications, one that goes
around an absence of dangerousness finding. This difference in state interest gives
further weight to the possibility of the state administering antipsychotic medication
to a defendant based on the severity of his charges. Sell specifically applied only to
non-violent offenses, but it is easy to conceive how the government may in the future
seek to administer antipsychotic medication to an individual who poses no threat or
danger, but is being charged with a violent offense, such as murder, burglary, or
rape. Under the analysis applied in Riggins and Sell, adjudication of this serious
offense would be a much more important governmental interest than would
adjudication of fraud and money laundering charges.145 This distinction between
143
In the case of the two lower court opinions cited (see Kourey, 276 F.Supp.2d 580, and
Colon, 2003 WL 21730603), the fact that administration of the drugs did not happen does not
contradict this conclusion, since both courts found that administration of the drugs was
permissible based on the fact that each individual was dangerous. Therefore, even though the
defendant’s liberty interests were not immediately violated, the circumstances could very well
change in each case, if more extensive findings were gathered or the person failed to comply
with all the details of the court’s instructions for accepting the medication. In either instance,
it is easy to conceive how the person’s liberty interest can be violated, and, therefore, that
interest has no greater protection before Sell than it does after, once that dangerous finding has
been made.
144

Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing the progeny of penological interests cases).

145

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36 (“[T]he State might have been able to justify medically
appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an
adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means”) (citing Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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violent and non-violent offenses simply draws another line in the sand by which the
state may be able to deprive the individual of his significant liberty interest. It is
easy to imagine that such a case will find its way on to the Court’s docket soon
enough.
V. CONCLUSION
In Sell, the Supreme Court added a layer of protection for individuals faced with
a serious threat to their significant liberty interest in remaining free of unwanted
medication. However, the layer is thin at best. By distinguishing between dangerous
and non-dangerous individuals, the Court leaves a gaping loophole through which
the government will be able to violate protected interests. Upon a mere showing of
dangerousness, lower courts will apply the comparatively deferential Harper test
instead of the articulated Sell test. Moreover, the definition of “dangerousness”
includes those who pose a threat to others or themselves. This leads to the risk that a
showing of dangerousness may easily be met because the government, by definition,
would not be seeking to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication absent
some mental disease, and those individuals may easily be found to pose a threat to
themselves. Once this showing has been made, lower courts will be free to order
forced administration of the antipsychotic drugs in violation of the defendant’s
significant liberty interest to remain free of those drugs.
Further, even if this showing cannot be made, the Court leaves open the question
whether such forced administration may even be constitutionally permissible to meet
a more significant government interest than adjudication of fraud charges, such as
adjudication of a violent offense, such as murder. Instead of leaving these answers
uncertain and providing only a thin layer of protection, the Court should have
adopted the clear-cut strict scrutiny standard in all forcible administration of
antipsychotic medication cases. Absent the adoption of this standard in all instances,
certainly the Court should have adopted that standard when penological interests are
not involved. Instead, the Court’s treatment of these issue leaves open many
questions which will have to be addressed another day, while in the meantime scores
of defendants’ significant liberty interests in remaining free from unwanted
antipsychotic medication will be violated.
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